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For many years, psychologists have debated whether there is an 
altruistic or prosocial personality that is enduring over time and sit-
uations (Gergen, Gergen, & Meter, 1972). Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaert-
ner, and Clark (1981) asserted that the search for an altruistic per-
sonality is futile, and Batson (1991) expressed doubts about its 
existence. Others (e.g., Penner & Finkelstein, 1998; Staub, 1974) 
have argued that people do differ in the degree to which they con-
sistently behave in caring ways.
Penner and Finkelstein (1998) defined the prosocial personality 
as “an enduring tendency to think about the welfare and rights of 
other people, to feel concern and empathy for them, and to act in a 
way that benefits them” (p. 526). Defined in this manner, the proso-
cial personality may include other-oriented values, cognitions, and 
prosocial actions as well as sympathy and empathy. Because it usu-
ally is impossible to unequivocally differentiate between other-ori-
ented behaviors and those driven by less lofty motives, investiga-
tors have been concerned with internal processes, such as sympathy 
or empathy and moral cognitions (e.g., moral reasoning), believed 
to motivate other-oriented behavior.
Empathy frequently has been defined as an emotional reaction 
elicited by and congruent with another’s emotional state or condi-
tion (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Hoffman, 1982). Eisenberg et al. 
(1994) and Hoffman (2000) have argued that empathic respond-
ing often results in sympathy (concern for another based on the 
apprehension or comprehension of the other’s emotional state or 
condition), although it also can lead to empathic overarousal (or 
personal distress, an aversive, self-focused emotional reaction to 
the apprehension or comprehension of another’s emotional state 
or condition; Batson, 1991). Batson (1991) hypothesized that sym-
pathy (called empathy by Batson) involves other-oriented motiva-
tion, whereas personal distress involves the egoistic motive of al-
leviating one’s own aversive negative emotional state. Consistent 
with such theorizing, sympathy generally has been positively re-
lated to prosocial behavior, especially behavior that is likely to be 
based on other-oriented emotions and values (Batson, 1991; Eisen-
berg & Fabes, 1998; Penner, in press). Moreover, cognitive per-
spective taking, which involves cognitively taking the role of the 
other or accessing information from memory to assist in one’s un-
derstanding of another’s situation, has been hypothesized to pro-
mote sympathy (Batson, 1991; Hoffman, 1982) and has been em-
pirically linked to prosocial behavior (e.g., Eisenberg, Zhou, & 
Koller, 2001; Underwood & Moore, 1982). Thus, sympathy, per-
spective taking, and, to a limited degree, empathy can be consid-
ered measures of a prosocial disposition that are expected to moti-
vate altruistic behavior (Hoffman, 2000; Penner, Fritzsche, Craiger, 
& Freifeld, 1995).
Because individuals’ reasoning regarding moral decisions (i.e., 
moral reasoning) is believed to influence the quality of their moral 
behavior (Eisenberg, 1986; Hoffman, 1987; Kohlberg, 1981), rea-
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soning about prosocial moral issues can be viewed as an important 
component of prosocial functioning. Until the 1970s, however, 
nearly all of the research on moral judgment was based on Kohl-
berg’s (1981) pioneering theory and interview methods, which 
focus primarily on principles of justice (e.g., moral conflicts in 
which rules, laws, authorities’ dictates, and formal obligations 
are central). Although there has been much less research on pos-
itive aspects of moral reasoning (Eisenberg, 1986; Garmon, Bas-
inger, Gress, & Gibbs, 1996; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988), there 
is a growing body of work on care-related concerns in moral con-
flicts and on prosocial moral reasoning—reasoning about moral 
dilemmas in which one person’s needs or desires conflict with 
those of others in a context in which the role of prohibitions, au-
thorities’ dictates, and formal obligations is minimal (Eisenberg, 
Carlo, Murphy, & Van Court, 1995; Eisenberg-Berg, 1979). Al-
though moral reasoning generally is not viewed as an aspect of 
personality, it seems to contribute to the consolidation of a proso-
cial disposition and could be expected to correlate with prosocial 
personal characteristics.
The purpose of the present study was to obtain evidence for the 
existence of a prosocial personality in adulthood, with its roots in 
childhood. To this end, we examined the consistency of various 
measures of prosocial functioning across reporters and time and the 
stability of aspects of individuals’ prosocial functioning over time 
(i.e., in terms of interindividual ranking in correlations).
Evidence for the Existence of a Prosocial Personality
Data from a longitudinal study were used to examine these is-
sues. On the basis of both theory and prior research (e.g., Eisenberg, 
1986; Hoffman, 2000; Penner & Finkelstein, 1998; Staub, 1974), 
we expected to find modest to moderate consistency both among 
components of a prosocial personality and between these compo-
nents and adults’ moral judgments about prosocial moral dilemmas. 
In addition, consistency in prosocial functioning was expected over 
years, although less consistency was predicted for moral reason-
ing than for prosocial personality characteristics because level of 
moral judgment is believed to reflect change in structure of the rea-
soning (i.e., how it is cognitively organized, the level of perspec-
tive taking underlying it), as well as in its content, from childhood 
into adulthood (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, 
& Lieberman, 1983; Eisenberg, 1986; Kohlberg, 1981).
Two types of data are pertinent to the issue of whether there 
are stable and enduring individual differences in the tendency to 
care about and help others: (a) data on the consistency of prosocial 
behaviors and dispositions across contexts, measures, or reporters, 
and (b) data on the stability of prosocial tendencies over time. Ev-
idence of consistency in prosocial responding across concurrent 
measures, contexts, and reporters is mixed. Findings of cross-situ-
ational consistency are modest for children, adolescents, and adults 
(Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997), which is 
not surprising given that prosocial actions in different contexts of-
ten may reflect different motives. On the basis of the limited cross-
situational consistency in helping behavior, Penner, Escarraz, and 
Ellis (1983) suggested that the search for the prosocial personal-
ity would be more fruitful if one looked for a constellation of traits 
that was associated with broad prosocial tendencies. However, re-
search on the prosocial personality is limited, especially work that 
includes multiple reporters and methods.
Surprisingly few investigators have studied the relations of 
young adults’ prosocial and empathy-related dispositions to their 
prosocial moral judgment. There are numerous reasons to expect an 
association. First, researchers such as Kohlberg and Candee (1984) 
and Rest (1979) have argued that moral reasoning influences indi-
viduals’ moral decisions and social behavior. Moreover, Hoffman 
(1987, 2000) suggested that empathy/sympathy bonds with moral 
principles, provides the motivational force to act on those princi-
ples, and stimulates the development of internalized moral rea-
soning reflecting concern for others’ welfare. In addition, Eisen-
berg (1986) suggested that sympathy primes the use of preexisting 
other-oriented moral cognitions.
Consistent with theory, moral reasoning, including prosocial 
moral judgment, generally has been modestly correlated with pro-
social behaviors such as helping or sharing, especially costly proso-
cial behaviors (Eisenberg, 1986; Janssens & Dekovic, 1997). Spe-
cifically, children’s and adolescents’ prosocial behavior generally 
has been positively correlated with needs-oriented (primitive em-
pathic) reasoning and negatively related to hedonistic reasoning; in 
addition, it sometimes has been positively correlated with a com-
posite measure of prosocial moral reasoning, especially at ages 15–
16 to 19–20 (Eisenberg et al., 1995; Eisenberg, Miller, Shell, Mc-
Nalley, & Shea, 1991). The relation of prosocial moral reasoning to 
prosocial behavior and empathy or sympathy seldom has been ex-
amined in adulthood. It has been argued that the relation between 
moral reasoning and behavior becomes even stronger in adulthood 
than in childhood because higher level reasoning is associated with 
the “progressive stripping away of bases for justifying behavior 
that are extrinsic to principle” (Rholes & Bailey, 1983, p. 104); this 
results in stronger motivation to maintain consistency between at-
titudes and behaviors at higher stages of development (Kohlberg & 
Candee, 1984). Thus, in the present study, self-and friend-reported 
prosocial tendencies (e.g., helping, sympathy, perspective taking) 
in early adulthood were expected to be positively related to concur-
rent overall reasoning level and negatively correlated with hedonis-
tic reasoning.
There also is empirical support that level and/or type of pro-
social moral reasoning is related to dispositional perspective tak-
ing or sympathy in childhood and adolescence (Carlo, Eisenberg, 
& Knight, 1992; Eisenberg et al., 1987, 1991, 1995; Underwood 
& Moore, 1982). Generally, sympathy and perspective taking have 
been associated with more other-oriented, less self-oriented, and/
or higher level prosocial moral reasoning. To our knowledge, these 
relations have not been examined in adults older than 19 or 20. 
In the present study, we examined the association of measures of 
sympathy, perspective taking, and prosocial behavior to prosocial 
moral reasoning, as assessed with both interviews and an objective 
measure of prosocial moral judgment. As has been found in adoles-
cence, higher level moral reasoning was expected to correlate with 
greater sympathy and perspective taking.
When one examines relations between measures of a prosocial 
personality or moral judgment and specific prosocial behaviors, it 
is important to consider the motivational significance of the partic-
ular prosocial behavior when possible. Eisenberg-Berg and Hand 
(1979) hypothesized that preschoolers’ spontaneous sharing behav-
iors, which often involve a cost to the child, are more other-ori-
ented than are everyday helping behaviors, which generally entail 
little cost or are performed merely to comply with peers’ requests. 
They found that spontaneous sharing, but not spontaneous help-
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ing or compliant sharing or helping, was associated with higher 
level needs-oriented prosocial moral reasoning (Eisenberg-Berg 
& Hand, 1979). Moreover, spontaneous prosocial behavior but not 
compliant prosocial behavior has been correlated with sympathy in 
young children (Eisenberg, McCreath, & Ahn, 1988; also see Lar-
rieu & Mussen, 1986). In contrast, frequency of compliant proso-
cial behavior has been associated with preschoolers’ personal dis-
tress when exposed to another’s negative emotion and seems to be 
linked to low to average social competence (Eisenberg, Cameron, 
Tryon, & Dodez, 1981; Eisenberg et al., 1988). Furthermore, costly 
but not low-cost prosocial behaviors have been associated with 
higher level moral judgment in childhood and adolescence (Eisen-
berg et al., 1987; Eisenberg & Shell, 1986). Eisenberg and Shell 
(1986) hypothesized that low-cost behaviors are performed rather 
automatically, without much cognitive reflection, moral or other-
wise. Thus, one would expect measures of a prosocial personal-
ity in adulthood to relate to earlier prosocial measures primarily if 
the latter reflected an other-orientation (e.g., sympathy/empathy) or 
costly, spontaneous prosocial action. Prosocial measures in adult-
hood were not expected to relate to compliant prosocial behavior 
or low-cost prosocial behavior (e.g., helping) in childhood.
Research examining consistency of prosocial tendencies across 
substantial periods of time is rarer than is work on concurrent con-
sistency among aspects of prosocial tendencies. Several research-
ers have reported modest correlations over a year or a few years in 
childhood for raters’ perceptions of children’s prosocial behavior 
(e.g., Bar-Tal & Raviv, 1979; Block & Block, 1973) or for actual 
donating or helping behavior (Eisenberg et al., 1987); in the 2nd 
decade of life, self-reports or other reports of prosocial behavior or 
sympathy have been correlated over 2 to 8 years (Davis & Franzoi, 
1991; Eisenberg et al., 1995). Of particular note, in the sample in 
this study, observed naturally occurring, spontaneous, costly pro-
social behaviors (i.e., spontaneous sharing) in the preschool years, 
but not other compliant or less costly prosocial behaviors, gener-
ally were associated with sympathy and a prosocial disposition in 
adolescence and early adulthood and were marginally positively re-
lated to self-reported prosocial dispositions (but not friend-reported 
prosociality) at age 23–24 (although compliant sharing was posi-
tively related to self-reported helping in adolescence; Eisenberg et 
al., 1999). To our knowledge, there have been no longitudinal stud-
ies of the consistency of a prosocial orientation from adolescence 
into the 3rd decade of life.
There are several reasons to expect consistency in prosocial re-
sponding across time. First, theorists have suggested that prosocial 
behavior and empathy-related responding have a genetic basis (e.g., 
Hoffman, 1981), and researchers have obtained evidence of their 
heritability (Emde et al., 1992; Loehlin & Nichols, 1976; Rushton, 
Fulker, Neale, Nias, & Eysenck, 1986; Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, 
& Emde, 1992). Moreover, both prosocial behavior and sympathy 
are correlated with temperamental predispositions such as regula-
tion (e.g., Eisenberg, Fabes, Karbon, et al., 1996; Eisenberg, Fabes, 
Murphy, et al., 1996; Rothbart, Ahadi, & Hershey, 1994) that likely 
have a constitutional basis (albeit influenced by the environment; 
Rothbart & Bates, 1998). Thus, biological factors could account 
not only for interspecies but also for intraspecies variation in pro-
social responding.
Environmental factors, in addition to heredity, likely contrib-
ute to the development of a prosocial disposition. Bergeman et al. 
(1993) found that agreeableness (which includes prosocial tenden-
cies; Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997) was influenced by shared rear-
ing environmental influences. Krueger, Hicks, and McGue (2001) 
also found that altruism was influenced primarily by shared and 
nonshared environmental influences. Moreover, numerous parental 
child-rearing practices as well as the security of attachment in in-
fancy have been associated with the development of prosocial be-
havior and sympathy (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Kestenbaum, Far-
ber, & Sroufe, 1989). In fact, child-rearing practices of parents of 
5-year-old children have predicted the children’s empathy at age 
31 (Koestner, Franz, & Weinberger, 1990). Thus, one might expect 
some consistency in prosocial behavior during childhood and ado-
lescence due to consistency in socialization experiences. Moreover, 
because moral judgment may change in qualitative ways with in-
creases in the abilities to take others’ and society’s perspective and 
to think abstractly (Kohlberg, 1981), it is unclear to what extent 
one can expect moral judgment to be consistent across early adult-
hood and to relate to prosocial tendencies at a younger age.
In summary, consistency across measures of a prosocial dispo-
sition and between measures of such a disposition and prosocial 
moral reasoning was expected in early adulthood. In addition, indi-
vidual measures (or composite measures) of prosocial responding 
or prosocial moral judgment were expected to be consistent over 
time, although more so for measures of traits such as sympathy, 
perspective taking, and reported prosocial behavior than for moral 
reasoning. Further, in general, prosocial behavior, sympathy, and 
perspective taking in childhood and adolescence were expected to 
relate to prosocial dispositions in adulthood; the exception was for 
childhood measures of prosocial behavior that tap compliant and/
or low-cost prosocial behavior, which were not expected to predict 
later prosocial dispositions. Finally, because moral judgment may 
change in qualitative ways with increases in the abilities to take 
others’ and society’s perspective and to think abstractly (Kohlberg, 
1981), it was unclear to what extent one might expect moral judg-
ment to relate to prosocial tendencies at a younger age.
Method
Study Participants
The participants in this study were recruited when they were pre-
schoolers in a university-run preschool used primarily by families from 
the community (Eisenberg-Berg & Hand, 1979). The longitudinal cohort 
consisted of 16 women and 16 men (all Euro-American, except 2 of His-
panic origin) who had been interviewed nine times previously, at ages 
4–5, 5.5–6.5, 7–8, 9–10, 11–12, 13–14, 15–16, 17–18, and 19–20 years 
(at 204, 186, 168, 144, 120, 96, 72, 48, and 24 months prior to the first 
assessment in this study; see Eisenberg et al., 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999). 
Three additional 2-year follow-ups are discussed in this article (Assess-
ments 10 to 12); the 12 testing sessions henceforth are referred to as 
Times 1 to 12 (T1 to T12). The mean age of the participants at T10 was 
258 months (range  =  247–267 months, approximately age 21–22 years); 
they were approximately 23–24 years (M  =  281.00 months, SD  =  4.50) 
and 25–26 years (M  =  305.00 months; SD  =  4.02) at the T11 and T12 
follow-ups, respectively. No participants were lost from T3 to T10 (al-
though interviews could not be obtained for some participants at T9 and 
T10), 1 refused any participation at T11 (so n  =  31 at T11) but not at T12 
(n  =  32), and 5 additional children were lost when they were young (3 
boys, 2 girls; the original sample was 37 children). Mean years of mater-
nal and paternal education for this sample (as reported at T8) were 16.0 
and 17.0, respectively (range  =  12–20 years for both). At age 23–24 
(T11), 2 of the participants had junior college degrees, 14 had graduated 
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college (4 of whom were in graduate school), 1 had some college but did 
not seem to be in school, 10 were still in college, and 4 were high school 
graduates with very little or no college education. At T12, 2 reported ad-
vanced degrees (a law degree or a master’s) and 1 was in law school, 16 
more had graduated from college (1 had some master’s training), 8 were 
still earning a bachelor’s degree, 2 had quit college or had a 2-year de-
gree, and 3 had only a high school education. Occupations of those who 
had not finished 4 years of college included retail sales, data entry, home-
making, a nail technician who owned her own business, and a flight at-
tendant. Occupations for college graduates were diverse; the graduates 
included a music teacher, a lawyer, an associate investment banker, 2 
sales representatives, 2 account managers, a police officer, a dispatcher 
for the police department, a chemist, a corporate communications expert, 
and an Internet services specialist. One person was unemployed.
Instruments
Prosocial Behavior and Orientation
A variety of measures were used to assess components of a proso-
cial personality at various ages. At T10 to T12, all measures were self-
or friend reported; some earlier measures were behavioral or mother 
reported. Generally, the measures reflect the notion that a prosocial per-
sonality involves both helpfulness and other-oriented sympathy/empathy 
(Penner & Finkelstein, 1998).
Self-reports. At T6, T7, and T8, children filled out a 23-item adapted 
version of Rushton, Chrisjohn, and Fekken’s (1981) self-report helping 
scale, the Self-Report Altruism Scale. Children indicated on a 5-point 
scale (ranging from never to very often) how frequently they engaged in 
23 behaviors, such as giving money to charity or volunteer work (alphas 
at T10 to T12  = .86, .90, and .87, respectively; Eisenberg et al., 1991, 
1995). At T10 to T12, participants filled out a 14-item adapted version 
of Rushton et al.’s (1981) Self-Report Altruism Scale taken from Penner 
et al. (1995; αs  = .85, .67, and .78 at T10 to T12, respectively) using the 
same response scale. This measure overlaps in items with the longer 23-
item version of the measure completed at T6 to T8 (but not T9).
At T10 to T12, as at T9, self-reported moral behavior also was as-
sessed with portions of Weinberger’s Adjustment Inventory (WAI; Wein-
berger, 1991, 1997). Items from the longer version of two restraint sub-
scales that concerned moral behavior were used (rated 1  =  false; 5  = 
true): Consideration of Others (e.g., “I often go out of my way to do 
things for other people”; 7 items; αs  = .78, .84, and .83 at T10 to T12, re-
spectively), and Suppression of Aggression (e.g., “I lose my temper and 
‘let people have it’ when I’m angry”; 7 items; αs  = .76, .84, and .85 at 
T10 to T12, respectively). Items within each subscale were averaged (see 
Eisenberg et al., 1995, for T9 alphas).
At T10 to T12, several measures of prosocial orientation were taken 
from Penner and Finkelstein’s (1998) instrument; these included empa-
thy-related responding (described below), social responsibility, and a care 
orientation. Specifically, a subset of 15 items from Schwartz’s (1968) As-
cription of Responsibility to the Self Scale (henceforth called social re-
sponsibility) was included (e.g., “If a good friend of mine wanted to in-
jure an enemy of his/hers, it would be my duty to try to stop him/her”; 1 
=  strongly disagree, 5  =  strongly agree; αs at T10, T11, and T12  = .81, 
.70, and .65, respectively). Moreover, 4 items reflecting a care orienta-
tion (e.g., “My decisions are usually based on my concern for other peo-
ple”; αs at T10 to T12  = .81, .81, and .87, respectively) were rated on the 
same scale.
Mothers’ reports. Mothers rated children’s prosocial behavior using 
a slightly adapted 23-item version of the Rushton et al. (1981) scale at 
T6, T7, and T8 and the same response scale. The scale was very sim-
ilar to the one filled out by the child participants. Alphas could not be 
computed because mothers frequently used the additional option of don’t 
know (Eisenberg et al., 1991, 1995).
Friends’ reports. At T10, T11, and T12, participants were asked to 
provide the names of up to 3 friends who might be willing to fill out 
short questionnaires about the participants. At T10, reports from at least 
1 friend were obtained for 28 participants, and reports for 2 and 3 friends 
were obtained for 20 and 11 participants, respectively (for a total of 59 
friends). Analogous numbers were 24, 18, and 6 (total  =  48) at T11 and 
23, 21, and 10 (total  =  54) at T12. Only 9 friends were the same individ-
uals at T10 and T11, and 17 of the same individuals were friends at T11 
and T12. Mean lengths of the friendships at T10 to T12, as reported by 
friends, were 68, 86, and 101 months, respectively. If reports from more 
than 1 friend were obtained, they were averaged across each item on each 
questionnaire to produce more reliable measures (Epstein, 1979).
Friends responded to items from the short form of the WAI rat-
ing items, which contains 3 items per scale. Items on these subscales 
were similar to those used in the participant-report measures pertain-
ing to consideration of others and suppression of aggression. Alpha co-
efficients at T10 to T12 for the 3-item scales were .88, .88, and .83, re-
spectively, for Consideration of Others and .85, .69, and .61, respectively, 
for Suppression of Aggression. Friends also reported on participants’ so-
cial responsibility using 10 of the same items filled out by participants 
(with slight changes in wording; αs at T10 to T12 were .72, .85, and .68, 
respectively).
Observed prosocial behavior in preschool. At T1, children were ob-
served by at least two coders in the preschool in random order for a min-
imum of seventy 2-min timings (and a maximum of 113) over 6 to 11 
weeks. Six observers coded each instance of three prosocial behaviors: 
(a) sharing—the child gives away or allows another child temporary use 
of a material object previously in the child’s possession (but not as part of 
a game; e.g., sharing of tea cups when playing tea was not coded as shar-
ing); (b) helping—the child attempts to alleviate another’s nonemotional 
needs; for example, assists another by giving information, helps another 
with a task, or offers an object not previously in the giver’s possession 
(these behaviors were not coded as helping if they occurred as part of co-
operative play and involved the completion of a mutual goal); and (b) of-
fers comfort—the child attempts to alleviate the emotional needs of an-
other; for example, tries to make another feel better when in distress. 
Each behavior was coded as having occurred spontaneously, as having 
occurred in response to a verbal or nonverbal request from a peer (e.g., 
“asked for” or compliant prosocial behavior), or that it could not be de-
termined whether the prosocial action was spontaneous. Comforting was 
very infrequent and was combined with helping (see Eisenberg-Berg & 
Hand, 1979). The final categories of prosocial behavior were proportions 
of time per 2-min observance of spontaneous sharing, compliant sharing, 
spontaneous helping, and compliant helping. As reported in Eisenberg et 
al. (1999), mean interrater reliabilities ranged from 75% to 86% exact 
agreement (computed only during 2-min intervals in which at least one 
observer viewed a prosocial behavior).
Empathy-Related Responding
Reports of empathy-related responding were obtained from partici-
pants and friends.
Self-reports. For our assessment of empathy-related responding 
at T10 to T12, participants completed two 7-item subscales of Davis’s 
(1983, 1994) Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI): Sympathy or Em-
pathic Concern (the tendency to experience feelings of warmth and con-
cern for others; e.g., “I have tender, concerned feelings for people less 
fortunate than me”; αs  = .81, .83, and .82, respectively), and Perspec-
tive Taking (the tendency to adopt the point of view of others; e.g., “I 
sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things 
look from their perspective”; αs  = .82, .80, and .87, respectively). These 
items also were part of Penner and Finkelstein’s (1998) measure of a pro-
social personality. Items were rated from 1  =  strongly disagree to 5  = 
strongly agree. Items on each scale were averaged (after reversing items 
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if appropriate). These same scales were completed at T7, T8, and T9 (but 
were rated on a 7-point scale at T9). Bryant’s (1982) 22-item empathy 
scale (e.g., “It makes me sad to see a girl who can’t find anyone to play 
with”) was completed at T4, T5, and T6.
Friends’ reports. The friends’ questionnaire packet included the seven 
Sympathy (Empathic Concern) items in the IRI plus one additional item 
(i.e., “My friend has a tendency to feel concern for others’ misfortunes 
even when he/she doesn’t know those people personally”; αs  = .89, .88, 
and .94 for T10, T11, and T12, respectively) and six of the seven Per-
spective Taking items (modified slightly from the original Davis, 1983, 
items to create an other-report format; αs  = .84, .92, and .87 for T10, 
T11, and T12, respectively). The item dropped from the Perspective Tak-
ing scale seemed particularly difficult for friends to answer (i.e., “My 
friend sometimes tries to understand his/her friends better by imagining 
how things look from their perspective”). At T9, friends responded to the 
same seven-item Sympathy and Perspective Taking scales as did partici-
pants (see Eisenberg et al., 1995).
Data Reduction of Measures of Prosocial and Empathy-Related 
Responding at T10 to T12
Self-report data. At T10 to T12, there were multiple measures of a 
prosocial orientation: sympathy, perspective taking, helping behavior, so-
cial responsibility, consideration for others, suppression of aggression, 
and care orientation. All correlations among these variables, except that 
between social responsibility and helping, were at least marginally sig-
nificant at both T10 (correlations ranged from .34 to .78, ps  < .059 or 
better) and T11 (correlations ranged from .30 to .81, ps  < .098 or better). 
At T12, all prosocial measures except self-reported helping were signifi-
cantly interrelated (correlations ranged from .38 to .78). The T12 self-re-
ported helping measure correlated at p  < .10 with social responsibility, 
sympathy, and perspective taking; the correlations for the relations of this 
measure with other indices of prosociality were all .23 or higher. More-
over, at all three times, all these measures grouped on the same factor in 
a principle components factor analysis with a varimax rotation; loadings 
ranged from .57 to .88 at T10, from .53 to .88 at T11, and from .55 to .85 
at T12. Although these factor analyses must be viewed with caution on 
the basis of the small sample size, they were consistent with the corre-
lations. Thus, scores on these measures were standardized and averaged 
to form a composite prosocial index at each follow-up. We constructed a 
similar prosocial composite at T9 using scales pertaining to consideration 
of others, suppression of aggression, perspective taking, and sympathy 
(see Eisenberg et al., 1995). Because means of composite scores involv-
ing standardized items were zero, means for the individual scales are pre-
sented in Table 1. 
Friends’ reports. The friend measures at T10 (consideration of oth-
ers, suppression of aggression, social responsibility, perspective taking, 
and sympathy) were all significantly interrelated, rs(26) ranged from .39 
to .72, with the exception of the correlation between social responsibil-
ity and consideration for others. At T11, all friend measures were signifi-
cantly correlated; rs(22)  = .52 to .84. At T12, all items were significantly 
related, rs(21)  = .47 to .73, with the exception that social responsibility 
and suppression of aggression were marginally related, r(21)  = .35, p  < 
.097, and sympathy and suppression of aggression were nonsignificantly 
correlated, r(21)  = .31. Therefore, the various measures were standard-
ized and averaged at each time period to form composite measures of 
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Major Variables at T10, T11, and T12
                                                                           T10                                         T11                                         T12
Measure                                                 M                       SD                     M                  SD                     M              SD
Self-reported
 Helpinga  2.93  0.59  2.92  0.44  3.08  0.51
 Consideration of othersa  4.00  0.63  4.05  0.60  3.98  0.64
 Suppression of aggressiona  3.68  0.76  3.59  0.66  3.92  0.78
 Care orientationb  3.59  0.69  3.63  0.72  3.60  0.77
 Social responsibilityc  3.39  0.61  3.64  0.44  3.71  0.47
 Sympathyd  3.88  0.67  4.06  0.57  3.99  0.59
 Perspective takingd  3.62  0.69  3.68  0.64  3.72  0.71
 Social desirabilitye  1.40  0.21  1.38  0.21  1.41  0.21
Friend reported
 Consideration of othersa  4.22  0.79  4.26  0.63  4.20  0.58
 Suppression of aggressiona  4.16  0.63  4.16  0.70  4.21  0.50
 Social responsibilityc  3.35  0.47  3.44  0.59  3.39  0.39
 Sympathyd  3.78  0.63  3.60  0.65  3.73  0.68
 Perspective takingd  3.35  0.72  3.09  0.72  3.19  0.64
Interview moral judgment
 Composite score  292.36  41.56    289.51  43.32
 Level 1f  0.13  0.12    0.13  0.16
 Level 2  0.24  0.09    0.24  0.08
 Level 3  0.21  0.15    0.23  0.16
 Level 4  0.31  0.18    0.28  0.16
 Level 5  0.12  0.14    0.12  0.12
PROM moral judgment
 Composite score/long form  194.9  11.2  196.6  9.5  193.9  8.7
Note. T = time; PROM = an objective measure of prosocial moral reasoning.
a From Weinberger’s Adjustment Inventory (Weinberger, 1991, 1997); scored on a 5-point scale. 
b From Penner and Finkelstein (1998); scored on a 5-point scale. 
c From Schwartz (1968); adapted by Penner and Finkelstein (1998); scored on a 5-point scale. 
d From the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983); scored on a 5-point scale. 
e From Crowne and Marlowe (1964); scored as true/false (1 or 2; 2 = higher social desirability).
f The levels are proportion scores.
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friends’ assessments of participants’ prosocial dispositions (henceforth 
labeled the friend prosocial measure). The composite scores were neg-
atively skewed at T10 and T11 and were transformed with square root 
transformations, although means are presented for nontransformed, indi-
vidual measures.
Prosocial Moral Reasoning
Prosocial moral reasoning was assessed with interviews at T10 and 
T12 and with an objective measure at T10, T11, and T12.
At T10 and T12, participants who were available (ns  =  28 at T10 
and 32 at T12) were interviewed with the same five moral reasoning sto-
ries used in the adolescent follow-ups (see Eisenberg et al., 1987, 1991, 
1995). In a typical story, the story protagonist had to choose between 
practicing swimming for a competition in which he or she likely would 
win a prize and using that time to teach handicapped children to swim. 
Story protagonists in four of the stories were specified as being the same 
sex as the participants; sex was unspecified in one story because the pro-
tagonists were a group. Participants were presented with the stories in 
random order and asked what the story protagonist should do and why. 
Standard probes were used to encourage participants to elaborate on their 
reasoning.
Scoring of the prosocial reasoning stories (interviews). Responses 
first were rated in terms of the extent to which their reasoning reflected 
each of the categories outlined by Eisenberg et al. (1987, 1991); multiple 
categories could be coded for each dilemma. Those used with any fre-
quency and relevant to this article were as follows: 
1. Hedonistic reasoning—(a) Hedonistic gain to the self (orientation 
to gain for oneself; e.g., “She might get a reward”), (b) direct reciproc-
ity (orientation to personal gain because of direct reciprocity or lack of 
reciprocity from the recipient of an act; e.g., “They might return the fa-
vor someday”), (c) affectional relationship (orientation to the individu-
al’s identification or relationship with another or liking for the other; e.g., 
“He might be a friend”);
2. Needs oriented (orientation to the physical, material, or psycholog-
ical needs of the other person; e.g., “He needs blood,” or “He’s sad”);
3. Stereotypes of a good or bad person (orientation to stereotyped im-
ages of a good or bad person; e.g., “It is the kind thing to do”);
4. Approval and interpersonal orientation (orientation to others’ ap-
proval and acceptance in deciding what is the correct behavior; e.g., 
“Others would think she did the right thing”);
5. Self-reflective empathic orientation—(a) sympathetic orientation 
(expression of sympathetic concern and caring for others; e.g., “He’d feel 
sorry for them”), (b) role taking (the individual explicitly takes the per-
spective of the other or has the story protagonist do so; e.g., “He’d think 
about how he would feel if he were in that situation”), (c) internalized 
positive affect related to consequences (orientation to internal positive 
affect as a result of a particular course of action because of the conse-
quences of one’s act for the other person; e.g., “She’d feel good because 
the children who needed help would walk better”), (d) internalized neg-
ative affect related to consequences (the same as Item c but for negative 
affect);
6. Internalized affect because of gain (loss) of self-respect due to liv-
ing up (not living up) to one’s values—(a) positive (orientation to feeling 
good, often about oneself, as a consequence of living up to internalized 
values; e.g., “She’d feel good about herself because she’d done what she 
knows is right”), (b) negative (concern with feeling bad as a consequence 
of not living up to internalized values; e.g., “He’d feel guilty if he didn’t 
help because he didn’t live up to his own values”);
7. Internalized law, norm, and value orientation (orientation to an in-
ternalized responsibility, duty, or need to uphold the laws and accepted 
norms or values; e.g., “All citizens of a society have a responsibility to 
help others when they need assistance”);
8. Other abstract and/or internalized types of reasoning—(a) gener-
alized reciprocity (orientation to indirect reciprocity in a society, i.e., ex-
change that is not one to one but eventually benefits all or a larger group; 
e.g., “If he helps that person, that person will assist others at another 
time, and everyone is more likely to be helped”), (b) concern with the 
condition of society (orientation to improving the society or community 
as a whole; e.g., “It is important to help one another so that the commu-
nity in general is a better place”), (c) concern with individual rights and 
justice (orientation to protecting individual rights and preventing injus-
tices that violate another’s rights; e.g., “Everyone should have the right 
to walk down the street without being accosted”), (d) equality of peo-
ple (orientation to the principle of the equal value of all people; e.g., “All 
people are of equal worth and thus are worthy of help”).
Participants were assigned scores reflecting the frequency with which 
they used each of the various types of reasoning when discussing both 
the pros and the cons of helping the needy other in the story dilemma 
(0  =  no use of category, 3  =  a major type of reasoning used). Then 
the scores for each category were summed across the stories. At T10 and 
T12, a team of 2 individuals jointly coded all the data for reliability. In-
terrater reliabilities for T1 to T9 are presented in previous articles (e.g., 
Eisenberg et al., 1987, 1991, 1995). For all time periods, the primary 
coder was the same person, whereas 11 persons have served as reliability 
coders over the 12 time periods. To prevent bias in scoring, we ensured 
that the primary coder as well as 1 reliability coder at T10 and both reli-
ability coders at T12 were unaware of the identity of the children. Cod-
ers also had no information regarding participants’ scores on the other 
measures. Interrater reliabilities at T10 (Pearson product-moment corre-
lations) computed for each reasoning category ranged from .68 to .98, 
with all except pragmatic reasoning being above .72. At T12, all reliabil-
ities were .80 or above, except that the reliability of concern for individ-
ual rights and justice was .73. The equality of people reasoning category 
was never coded at T12.
As previously noted, the primary coder for the moral reasoning pro-
tocols was the same person who had scored the data at all previous fol-
low-ups. We used this procedure to prevent differences across different 
coders at different times being interpreted as age-related changes in rea-
soning. To determine whether there was any change in the primary cod-
er’s scoring over the years (and to prevent the primary coder from know-
ing the age of participants being coded), two protocols from each of the 
T4 to T9 follow-ups were mixed together with the various protocols from 
T10 or T12 and were rescored by the primary coder. Scores on the data 
from earlier sessions were highly similar to the original scores for the 
same data (agreement on codes within 1 point was 84% or higher on all 
categories; correlations were .80 or higher).
The categories of reasoning are viewed as reflecting developmental 
levels of prosocial moral reasoning; these levels were derived from the re-
sults of cross-sectional research (see Eisenberg, 1986; 1979). Briefly, the 
levels are as follows: Level 1, hedonistic, self-focused orientation; Level 
2, needs of others orientation; Level 3, approval and interpersonal orien-
tation and stereotyped orientation; Level 4, self-reflective, empathic orien-
tation; and Level 5, strongly internalized orientation. As at earlier follow-
ups, we computed a composite index representing level of moral judgment 
for each participant at both T10 and at T12 by weighing the proportion of 
the participant’s reasoning at each level (as indicated by the 0 to 3 ratings 
for relevant categories summed across stories, divided by the total scores 
for all categories of reasoning) by the level of reasoning (e.g., 1 for hedo-
nistic, direct reciprocity, or affectional relationship reasoning; 2 for needs-
oriented reasoning; 3 for stereotypic or approval/interpersonal reasoning; 
4 for higher level reasoning; Eisenberg et al., 1987, for more detail). Be-
cause it is debatable whether Level 5 is more moral than Level 4 and be-
cause scores for these two levels were weighted equally in prior assess-
ments (as well as on the objective measure of moral judgment), scores for 
Levels 4 and 5 were weighted equally in the analyses presented (although 
the results did not change much if Level 5 was weighted higher). These 
proportion scores were multiplied by 100 for presentation. Scores at T10 
and T12 were negatively skewed, so log 10 transformations were used (al-
though untransformed means are presented).
The objective measure of prosocial moral judgment (PROM). At 
T10, T11, and T12 (as at T9), participants (Ns  =  32, 31, and 32, respec-
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tively) completed an objective, pencil-and-paper measure of prosocial 
moral reasoning, the PROM (Carlo et al., 1992; Eisenberg et al., 1995). 
At T9, participants were mailed a version of the PROM containing six 
stories, five of which were very similar in content to the vignettes used 
in the moral reasoning interview. At T10, T11, and T12, participants 
were sent a similar version designed for adults (including one additional 
story and nine rather than six responses per story). The PROM is mod-
eled on Rest’s (1979) Defining Issues Test; participants are presented 
with moral dilemmas and then rate the importance of reasons why the 
protagonist should or should not help the needy other in a given story 
on a 7-point scale (1  =  not at all, 7  =  greatly). At T10 to T12, each 
of the stories included two hedonistic items that pertained to hedonis-
tic or direct reciprocity reasoning (e.g., “It depends how much fun Mary 
expects the party to be, and what sorts of things are happening at the 
party”), one needs-oriented item (e.g., “It depends whether the girl re-
ally needs help or not”), two approval-oriented items (e.g., “It depends 
whether Mary’s parents and friends will think she did the right or she 
did the wrong thing”), one stereotypic item (e.g., “It depends if Mary 
thinks it’s the decent thing to do or not), and two items reflecting higher 
level reasoning (i.e., sympathetic, perspective taking, internalized affect, 
or abstract internalized reasoning; e.g., “It depends if Ann would feel 
guilty if the girl is hurt because she did not help”). The ninth reason-
ing choice was a lie/nonsense item which sounded abstract but did not 
make sense (e.g., “It depends whether Mary believes in people’s values 
of metacognition or not”). These items were used merely to eliminate 
participants who scored high on this subscale (although none was elimi-
nated because doing so had virtually no effect on the results). Alphas for 
the hedonistic, needs-oriented, approval, stereotypic, internalized, and 
lie scales were .90, .70, .78, .95, .89, and .88, respectively, at T10;.89, 
.68, .93, .78, .92, and .93, respectively, at T11; and .91, .86, .94, .92, .97, 
and .86, respectively, at T12.
As was done previously with the same or similar measures (Boehnke, 
Silbereisen, Eisenberg, Reykowski, & Palmonari, 1989; Carlo et al., 
1992) and at T9 (Eisenberg et al., 1995), scores on each of the PROM 
subscales (using two items per story when appropriate) were averaged 
across stories and then transformed to proportion scores by dividing each 
of the PROM subscale scores (for the five types of reasoning) by the 
sum of the five PROM subscale scores. On the basis of the means in this 
study and the findings in Carlo et al. (1992) and Eisenberg et al. (1995), 
a weighted score was computed in which percentage of internalized rea-
soning was multiplied by 3, percentages of needs-oriented and stereo-
typic reasoning were multiplied by 2, and percentages of hedonistic and 
approval-oriented reasoning were multiplied by 1. These weighted val-
ues were then summed. This composite score was used in subsequent 
analyses.
Social Desirability
To assess social desirability (SD), participants completed 25 true/
false items from an SD scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964; αs  = .86, .85, 
and .86 at T10, T11, and T12, respectively).
Procedures
At T10, T11, and T12, participants initially were contacted by phone 
if possible; then a packet of questionnaires was sent to the participants 
to fill out and return (order of the PROM and questionnaires was coun-
terbalanced). Participants were asked to supply names and addresses of 
up to three friends if they were willing to do so when they returned the 
questionnaires. Friends were sent packets of questionnaires and paid for 
their participation (see Eisenberg et al., 1987, 1991, 1995, for informa-
tion about childhood sessions).
At T10 and T12, participants (ns  =  28 at T10 and 32 at T12) were 
subsequently interviewed on their prosocial moral reasoning, usually at 
the university. Participants were interviewed individually by a woman 
who had not been involved in any follow-ups at T9 or earlier. The pro-
social dilemmas were presented in random order and involved same-
sex (or unspecified) protagonists, and a standard sequence of question-
ing was followed. Participants were paid for both the questionnaires and 
the interview.
Results
Means and standard deviations for the major variables at T10 
to T12 are presented in Table 1 (means for variables from ear-
lier periods and some for T9 are in Eisenberg et al., 1991, 1995, 
1999). A list of the major variables prior to T10 is provided in Ta-
ble 2. Recall that most of the indices of a prosocial personality 
were significantly correlated (and loaded on one factor) and were 
combined into a composite score at each assessment in adulthood, 
both for self-and friend reports. In initial analyses, we examined 
evidence for the existence of a prosocial personality as assessed 
with these composite scores within and across time (and explored 
issues to do with social desirability). Next, we examined consis-
tency in moral reasoning across time and measures. Then we cal-
culated the relations of measures of moral reasoning to indices 
of a prosocial disposition. In general, the focus is on T10 to T12 
measures in relation to antecedent measures, although relations 
of T9 PROM data with antecedent (as well as T10 to T12) mea-
sures are included because they were not reported in prior pub-
lications, and important concurrent patterns are briefly summa-
rized. Two-tailed correlations are reported throughout, although 
specific hypotheses frequently were formulated. Marginal corre-
lations are discussed only if they are consistent with the larger 
pattern of findings. 
All major correlational relations presented were examined for 
outliers (of three standard deviations or more) with the regres-
sion procedures of SPSS, computed for the two variables involved 
in each correlation. In very few cases were there outliers, and in 
most of these, the findings were stronger when the outliers were re-
moved (these findings are indicated in the tables). Moreover, scat-
ter plots were examined for all major findings, and the patterns of 
relations for significant correlations did not seem to be due to only 
a small number of cases.
Relations of SD to Moral Judgment and Prosocial Dispositions
SD scores at T10, T11, and T12 were significantly related to 
concurrent self-reported prosocial dispositions, rs(30, 27, and 29, 
respectively)  = .60, .61, and .53, ps  < .001, .001, and .002, but 
not to the interview moral reasoning scores or the PROM compos-
ite scores.
Because of the correlations between SD and some measures, we 
computed auxiliary partial correlations, controlling for SD, when 
examining correlations between two self-report measures. Usually, 
the partial correlations were similar to the zero-order correlations. 
Thus, zero-order correlations usually are reported, although partial 
correlations are also noted for key analyses involving self-reported 
prosociality composite scores.
Relations Between Reporters and Across Time on Measures of a 
Prosocial Personality
In general, there were numerous relations among various mea-
sures of prosocial functioning, often across reporters.
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Relations of Friends’ Reports to Participants’ Reports of Prosocial 
Traits at T10 to T12
Friend-and self-reported prosocial dispositions (the composite 
scores) were at least marginally positively related at T10 (21–22 
years), T11 (23–24 years), and T12 (25–26 years), rs(26, 22, and 
21, respectively)  =  .66, .35, and .56, ps  <  .001, .10, and .001. 
These relations held even though the measures of a prosocial dis-
position differed somewhat for friends and participants. Moreover, 
across time, T10 to T12 self-and friend-reported prosocial compos-
ite scores correlated with one another at p  < .075 or better (rs  = 
.37 to .48; average r  = .41).
Consistency of Prosocial Dispositions Across Time
In general, T10, T11, and T12 measures of a prosocial disposi-
tion were correlated not only among themselves but also with many 
similar measures obtained at younger ages.
Self-reported prosocial dispositions. Self-reported prosocial dis-
positions were significantly correlated across time at T10, T11, and 
T12; correlations ranged from .77 to .81, ps  < .001 (correlations 
ranged from .66 to .75 when we controlled for SD at any of the rel-
evant assessments). Self-reported prosociality at T10 to T12 also 
was related to earlier self-reports of similar prosocial tendencies. 
As can be seen in Table 2, there were many more significant cor-
Table 2. Correlations of T10, T11, and T12 Self-and Friend-Reported Prosocial Dispositions to Prosocial-Related 
Measures at Earlier Assessments
                                                                                 Self-reported                                  Friend-reported
                                                                                   prosociality                                       prosociality
Measure of prior prosocial or
empathy-related responding                     T10                T11                 T12                  T10               T12
Self-reported helpinga
 T6  .33† [.29]  .33†  .40*  .21  –.04
  (.29)  (.17)  (.36*)
 T7  .53** [.57***] .53**  .66***  .16  .02
  (.37*)  (.33†)  (.60***)
 T8  .54***  .54**  .49**  .42*  –.04
  (.54**)  (.60***)  (.53***)
Self-reported prosociality compositeb
 T9  .75***  .64***  .56***  .56**  .41*
  (.78***)  (.75***)  (.64***)
Empathyc
 T4  .16  .39*  .27  .11  .07
  (.11)  (.39*)  (.34†)
 T5  .46**  .52**  .30†  .47*  .10
  (.50**)  (.51**)  (.35†)
 T6  .58***  .68***  .67***  .32†  .24
  (.48**)  (.54**)  (.60***)
Sympathyd
 T7  .46**  .60***  .54***  .18  .67***
  (.27)  (.46*)  (.47**)
 T8  .68***  .75***  .47**  .38*  .34
  (.62***)  (.70***)  (.50**)
Perspective takingd
 T7  .44*  .50**  .53**  .09  –.02
  (.23)  (.42*)  (.49**)
 T8  .69***  .66***  .66**  .50** .17
  (.65***)  (.68***)  (.70**)
Mothers’ report of child’s helpinga
 T6  .41*  .49**  .44*  .21  .02
 T7  .32†  .22  .20  .16  .00
 T8  .48**  .44* .46**  .42*  .18
Note. Correlations in brackets are recomputed correlations, from which an outlier was thrown out. Correlations in parentheses 
are partial correlations in which we controlled for social desirability. There were no more significant and marginal relations be-
tween T11 friend-reported prosociality and other variables than would be expected by chance. T = time.
a On the adapted Rushton et al. (1981) measure. 
b This composite score included items from the sympathy, perspective taking, suppression of aggression, consideration for others, 
care orientation, and social responsibility scales at T10 to T12; at T9, the composite contained items related to the first four scales. 
c From Bryant’s (1982) empathy scale. 
d From Davis’s (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index. 
e This composite score included items from sympathy, perspective taking, consideration for others, suppression of aggression, 
and social responsibility at T10 to T12.
† p < .10.    * p < .05.    ** p < .01.    *** p < .001.
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relations than would be expected by chance between T10 to T12 
prosocial dispositions and self-reported prosociality/helping, em-
pathy, sympathy, and perspective taking in late childhood and ad-
olescence. Thirty-four of 42 zero-order correlations between self-
reported prosociality and measures of prosociality at younger ages 
were significant at p  < .05, two-tailed. Correlations between T10, 
T11, or T12 prosocial personality and self-reported helping at T6 
to T8 ranged from .33 to .66 (seven of nine were significant; aver-
age correlation for the nine correlations  = .48); those between T10, 
T11, or T12 prosocial dispositions and empathy at younger ages 
ranged from .16 to .68, with all but two being .30 or higher (aver-
age r  = .45; six of nine were significant). Analogous correlations 
for sympathy ranged from .46 to .75 (average r  = .58; all were sig-
nificant); those for perspective taking ranged from .44 to .69 (av-
erage r  = .58; all were significant); and those for mother-reported 
helping ranged from .20 to .49 (average r  = .38, with six of the 
nine correlations being .41 or higher and significant). The correla-
tions changed relatively little when SD was controlled.
It also is notable that individual measures of self-reported pro-
sociality were nearly always substantially related to the same or 
similar measures from up to 16 years earlier. For example, reports 
of helping at T10, T11, or T12 on a short version of Rushton et 
al.’s (1981) scale were significantly related to reports on the lon-
ger version of the scale at T6, T7, and T8, correlations ranged from 
.41 to .66 (average r  = .52), ps  < .02 or better. Similarly, sympa-
thy scores on the IRI at T10, T11, and T12 were positively related 
to empathy on Bryant’s (1982) scale at T5 (age 11–12), with cor-
relations ranging from .47 to .59 (average r  =  54), ps  < .007 or 
better, and at T6 (age 12–13), with correlations ranging from .59 
to .74 (average r  = .66), ps  < .001. Sympathy at T11 also was re-
lated to reported empathy at T4 (9–10 years), r(29)  = .49, p  < 
.005. Further, all correlations between the measures of sympathy at 
T10, T11, or T12 and those at T7, T8, and T9 were significant and 
ranged from .47 to .81 (average r  = .62; sometimes there was an 
outlier, but removing it only strengthened the correlations). Simi-
larly, correlations of measures of perspective taking at T10, T11, or 
T12 with those at T7 through T9 were all substantial (at least .44, 
usually .52 to .75; average r  = .62). These relations changed rela-
tively little when we controlled for SD. Thus, there was clear evi-
dence of intraindividual consistency in prosocial dispositions over 
time. In addition, self-reported prosocial dispositions at T10, T11, 
and T12 were significantly correlated with mothers’ reports of chil-
dren’s prosocial behavior at T6 and T8 (see Table 2).
In Eisenberg et al. (1999), relations of observed preschool pro-
social behavior with T10 and T11 prosocial dispositions were re-
ported (no other T10 or T11 data have been reported). Thus, we ex-
amine only findings for T12 in relation to T1 prosocial behavior. 
Consistent with prior findings (although the correlation was only 
marginally significant at T11), self-reported prosociality was posi-
tively related to observed preschool spontaneous sharing, r(30)  = 
.37, p  < .037. Unexpectedly, it also was positively related to com-
pliant sharing, r(30)  = .37, p  < .036.
Friends’ reports of prosocial dispositions at T10 to T12. Friends’ 
reports of participants’ prosocial dispositions at T10 were related to 
a number of earlier measures of prosocial and empathy-related re-
sponding, especially those from T8 and later. Recall that friend data 
were not available for a minority of participants and that the sam-
ple sizes for these analyses were small. Even with the small sample 
size for friend-report data, 8 of 42 possible correlations were sig-
nificant at p  < .05, two-tailed, when just over 1 correlation would 
be expected to be in the hypothesized direction by chance. T10 
friend-reported prosocial dispositions were correlated with self-
reported prosocial behavior at T8 and the self-reported prosocial 
composite at T9, self-reported empathy at T5, sympathy and per-
spective taking at T8, and mothers’ reports of children’s helping at 
T8 (these correlations ranged from .38 to .56; see Table 2). Fewer 
relations were obtained for T12 friend reports, perhaps because of 
the smaller sample size (23 friends); nonetheless, friends’ reports 
were significantly related to self-reported sympathy at T7 and to 
the participant-reported prosocial composite score at T9. Although 
a number of the correlations of friends’ report of a prosocial dispo-
sition at T11 with earlier measures of a prosocial disposition were 
positive and above .20, none was significant. 1
Relations between friend-reported prosociality at T10 or T11 
and preschool prosocial behavior are reported in Eisenberg et al. 
(1995) and were nonsignificant. However, consistent with T12 self-
reports, T12 friends’ reports of prosociality were marginally posi-
tively related to spontaneous sharing in preschool, r(21)  = .35, p 
< .099. 2
Moral Reasoning: Consistency Across Time and Measures
Relations among scores on the interview and objective mea-
sures of moral judgment were examined contemporaneously and 
across time.
Consistency over time within type of measure. T10 and T12 
moral reasoning composites were significantly related with one an-
other, r(26)  = .64, p  < .001, as well as with the T9 interview com-
posite score, rs(22 and 26, respectively)  = .48 and .39, ps  < .016 
and .038. Moral reasoning at T10 or T12 was not significantly re-
lated to reasoning in adolescence (at T7 or T8), with the excep-
tion of a significant relation between reasoning at T7 and at T12, 
r(30)  = .35, p  < .048. Thus, interview moral reasoning scores 
tended to be somewhat consistent over the 6 years in early adult-
hood but generally were not related to analogous interview scores 
in adolescence.
Even though the T9 PROM contained one less story and fewer 
items, T9 PROM scores were substantially related to scores at T10, 
T11, and T12, rs(30, 29, and 30, respectively)  = .71, .72, and .51, 
ps  < .001, .001. and .003. Moreover, T10, T11, and T12 PROM 
1 When individual T12 friend measures (instead of the composite) 
were related to the same variables as reported by participants, the num-
ber of significant relations was higher. For example, friends’ reports of 
participants’ sympathy at T12 were related to participants’ self-reported 
sympathy at T6 through T9, rs(14, 21, 20, and 21, respectively)  = .59, 
.76, .53, and .46, ps  < .015, .001, .011, and .028.
2 At T4 and T5 children had an opportunity to donate part of their 
payment to charity (see Eisenberg et al., 1987); these donations at T4 
were marginally related to T10 prosocial dispositions, r(30)  = .32, 
p  < .079. Children also had an opportunity to help the experimenter at 
T6, T7, and T8 by filling out additional questionnaires at home (Eisen-
berg et al., 1991); such helping at T6 was related to prosocial disposi-
tions at T10, T11, and T12, rs(30)  = .47, .43, and .38, ps  < .005, .015, 
and .031. Moreover, friend-reported prosocial dispositions at T10 were 
positively related to donations at T4, r(26)  = .41, p  < .032. The find-
ings for friends’ reports were not much more than would be expected by 
chance, and moral reasoning was not related to donating or helping at 
above chance levels.
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scores were highly interrelated: Correlations ranged from .50 be-
tween T11 and T12 to .76 between T10 and T11 (average r  = .63). 
Thus, there was interindividual consistency in level of performance 
on the PROM over the 6 years from T9 to T12.
Consistency of moral reasoning across measures. As at T9 
(Eisenberg et al., 1995), at T10 and T12 there were significant cor-
relations between concurrent PROM and interview moral reason-
ing composite scores (recall there was no moral reasoning inter-
view at T11), rs(26 and 29, respectively)  = .53 and .41, ps  < .004 
and .021, as well as some significant relations between the two 
measures across time in adulthood. In addition, T10 PROM scores 
were significantly related to interview moral reasoning composite 
scores at T9 and T8, rs(26 and 30, respectively)  = .52 and .41, ps 
< .005 and .018, whereas T11 PROM scores were significantly cor-
related with interview composite scores at T9 and T7, rs(25 and 29, 
respectively)  = .52 and .38, ps  < .005 and .036 (and p  < .06 for 
T8). T12 PROM scores were not significantly related to moral in-
terview scores prior to T10.
The Relation of Moral Reasoning to Prosocial Dispositions
Scores for both interview and PROM measures of moral judg-
ment were correlated with some measures of prosociality, often 
over numerous years.
The relation of moral reasoning to self-reported prosocial dis-
positions. Five measures of moral reasoning initially were cor-
related with indices of a prosocial personality. For the T10 and 
T12 interview moral reasoning data, results were computed for 
the composite score as well as for the type of reasoning most 
frequently associated with moral behavior in past assessments, 
Level 1 self-oriented reasoning (Eisenberg, 1986; Eisenberg et 
al., 1991, 1995). However, at T12, findings for these two mea-
sures were highly similar (albeit reversed), so only correlations 
with the composite score are presented. Because findings for 
PROM scores at T9 to T12 were similar, to reduce the number 
of correlations we standardized PROM scores for these four as-
sessments and averaged them to form a composite score for use 
in the analyses. Only zero-order correlations between the moral 
judgment measures and the self-reported prosociality composite 
scores are presented because controlling for SD had little effect 
on the pattern of relations (SD was unrelated to these measures of 
moral reasoning).
The PROM composite score was significantly correlated with 
self-reported prosocial dispositions at T9 to T12, empathy at T6, 
and sympathy at T7 and T8 (average r  = .43; 9 of 12 correlations 
in Table 3 were significant). With regard to the moral interview, 
moral reasoning at T10 tended to be related to self-reported proso-
ciality in adulthood, especially for self-oriented reasoning (average 
r  =  −.39 for self-oriented reasoning, with three of the four cor-
relations being significant; average correlations for the T10 com-
posite  = .22, ns). The T12 interview composite also usually was 
positively related to self-reported prosociality in adulthood (aver-
age r  = .39, with three of four latter correlations being significant). 
Further, there were numerous relations between measures of inter-
Table 3. Correlations of Interview Prosocial Moral Reasoning Scores at T10 and T12 With Measures of a Prosocial Dis-
position in Adulthood and Empathy/Sympathy in Childhood and Adolescence
                                                                                                 Measure of prosocial moral judgment
                                                                                          T10
                                                                                                                                                                T9 to T12
Measure of prosociality                                    Composite   Self-oriented          T12 composite      PROM composite 
Self-report prosocial compositea
 T9  .26  –.44*  .30†  .54*** (.72)***
 T10  .30  –.42*  .37*  .50** (.73***)
 T11  .20  –.43*  .37*  .42* (.66***)
 T12  .11  –.25  .52**  .39*
Friend-report prosocial compositeb
 T10  .34†  –.43*  .26 (.37*)  .39*
 T11  .08  –.09  .15  .11
 T12  .43*  –.43* .53**  .50*
Self-report empathyc
 T4  .39*  –.50**  .27 .19
 T5  .12  –.32† (–.45*)  .08  .30†
 T6  .11  –.34† (–.49**)  .48** .44**
Self-report sympathyd
 T7  .43*  –.55**  .54**  .49**
 T8  .40*  –.63***  .32†  .57***
Note. Correlations in parentheses are the correlations after we dropped an outlier. Controlling for social desirability had relatively lit-
tle effect on the correlations. T = time; PROM = an objective measure of prosocial moral reasoning.
a This composite score included items from sympathy, perspective taking, suppression of aggression, consideration for others, care 
orientation, and social responsibility scales at T10 to T12; at T9, the composite contained items related to the first four scales. 
b This composite score included items from sympathy, perspective taking, consideration for others, suppression of aggression, and so-
cial responsibility at T10 to T11; items from the first four scales were included at T9. 
c From Bryant’s (1982) empathy scale. d From Davis’s (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index.
† p < .10.    * p < .05.    ** p <.01.    *** p < .001.
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view prosocial moral judgment and measures of sympathy or em-
pathy at younger ages, including some with empathy reported at 
age 9–10 or 10–11. Five of nine correlations with measures of T4, 
T5, or T6 self-reported empathy were significant (dropping outli-
ers increased the significance of two correlations; average corre-
lation for all correlations  = .32; absolute values of all correlations 
ranged from .08 to .50; significant correlations ranged from .39 to 
.50), and five of six were significant with T7 and T8 sympathy (av-
erage r  = .48; absolute values of correlations ranged from .32 to 
.63). Thus, moral reasoning in adulthood was predicted by empa-
thy/sympathy at younger ages. 
Although they are not presented in detail, there also were some 
significant correlations in the predicted direction between moral 
reasoning (the four scores in Table 3) and self-reported helping and 
perspective taking at younger ages (especially T8); however, these 
findings were not as frequent as those for empathy and sympathy. 
Three of 12 correlations between measures of moral judgment and 
self-reported helping at T6 to T8 were significant at p  < .06 or bet-
ter (absolute values of significant correlations ranged from .35 to 
.42), and 2 of 8 correlations for T7 or T8 perspective taking were 
significant (absolute values were .35 and .36), all in the expected 
direction (and there were more significant relations if self-oriented 
interview moral reasoning at T12 was considered). The only rela-
tion of moral judgment to mothers’ reports of prosocial behavior 
(T6 to T8) was for the composite PROM score with T7 mother-re-
ported helping, r(25)  = .40, p  < .036.
Friends’ reports of a prosocial disposition. Seven of eight cor-
relations between measures of moral judgment at T10 and T12 
and friends’ reports of prosociality at T10 and T12 were signif-
icant (absolute values of the correlations ranged from .34 to .53 
when we dropped an outlier; average absolute value of r  = .43; 
see Table 3). Consistent with the lack of significant relations be-
tween T11 friend-reported prosociality and other measures of 
prosociality, T11 friends’ reports of participants’ prosocial dispo-
sitions were not significantly related measures of moral judgment 
(see Table 3). 3
Observed prosocial behavior in preschool. T10 interview 
moral reasoning composite and self-oriented scores as well as 
PROM scores at T9 to T11 were unrelated to prosocial behav-
ior in preschool. Unexpectedly, at T12, both the composite inter-
view and the PROM scores were positively related to compliant 
sharing in preschool, r(30)  = .43 and .42, ps  < .015 and .016, re-
spectively. 4
Discussion
The results of this study strongly support the view that there is 
a prosocial personality disposition, at least in middle-class individ-
uals in Western culture. Various aspects of prosocial responding, 
such as reported helping, prosocial values and attitudes, and sym-
pathy, were not only intercorrelated, but the aggregate measures of 
self-reported prosocial responding in adulthood generally were re-
lated with friends’ concurrent reports of a prosocial orientation and 
with prosocial markers obtained at younger ages. Specifically, self-
reported prosocial dispositions at ages 21–22 to 25–26 often re-
lated to self-reports of empathy, sympathy, and prosocial behavior, 
even 10 to 16 years earlier. Moreover, some measures of self-re-
ported prosociality were correlated with mothers’ reports of their 
children’s helping behavior in adolescence as well as with friends’ 
reports of prosocial dispositions 2 or 4 years prior or subsequent. 
Friends’ reports of participants’ prosocial dispositions at T10 and 
T12 were also related to some measures of a prosocial disposition 
years earlier (up to 10 years earlier for empathy). Further, self-re-
ported prosocial dispositions and prosocial moral reasoning on the 
objective measure of moral judgment (the PROM) were positively 
related to prosocial behavior when the participants were observed 
as preschoolers. Thus, these data provide some of the strongest ev-
idence available that prosocial dispositions emerge by late child-
hood and are relatively stable into adulthood. They also indicate 
that the seeds of a prosocial disposition can be found in early child-
hood. Further, the across-reporters findings, along with those found 
in other studies (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1987; Penner et al., 1995), 
provide some evidence of the validity of self-report measures of 
prosocial dispositions.
The associations between the preschool measures of real-life 
prosocial behavior and indices of prosocial functioning in adult-
hood are especially intriguing. As predicted, self-and friend re-
ports of a prosocial personality in adulthood were positively related 
to preschool spontaneous sharing—the type of prosocial behav-
ior that appears most likely to reflect other-oriented motivation 
in the preschool context (Eisenberg et al., 1981; Eisenberg et al., 
1999). Unexpectedly, however, T12 self-reported prosocial dispo-
sitions and T12 moral reasoning on both measures also were pos-
itively associated with requested (compliant) sharing in preschool. 
Although sharing (undifferentiated) has been linked to preschool-
ers’ sympathy (Eisenberg et al., 1988), preschool compliant pro-
social behavior (including compliant sharing) generally has been 
unrelated to young children’s moral reasoning or inconsistently 
(albeit sometimes) related to prosocial tendencies in adolescence 
(Eisenberg et al., 1999; Eisenberg-Berg & Hand, 1979). Perhaps 
children who engage in compliant sharing do not do so for sym-
pathy-related reasons yet develop a self-conception of themselves 
3 Self-reported personal distress (the tendency to feel unease and dis-
comfort in tense interpersonal settings involving others’ needs or emo-
tions; αs at T10 to T12  = .76, .66, and .84) also was reported by par-
ticipants at numerous assessments. Self-reported prosociality at T10 was 
negatively related to personal distress at T12, r(30)  =  −.42, p  < .015; 
T11 prosociality was negatively related to personal distress at T9, T11, 
and T12; rs(29)  =  −.38, −.39, and −.44, ps  < .036, .028, and .014, re-
spectively; and T12 prosociality was negatively related to personal dis-
tress at T11 and T12; correlations ranged from −.35 to −.44, ps  < .055 or 
better. However, all of these correlations became nonsignificant when SD 
was controlled in partial correlations. Friend-reported prosociality at T11 
(but not T10 or T12) was significantly negatively related to self-reported 
personal distress at T11 and T12. Personal distress was infrequently re-
lated to measures of prosocial moral judgment, and those correlations 
that were significant were nonsignificant when SD was partialed.
4 Years of education and marital status at T12 were not related to pro-
social reasoning or dispositions. Individuals who were still in college (in-
cluding graduate school) at T12 (age 25–26) scored somewhat lower in 
self-rated prosociality than did individuals who were not in college (or 
who had not gone to college), r(20)  =  −.38, p  < .033 (point biserial 
correlation). However, the fact that T12 college students also were rated 
lower by friends in prosociality at T11, whereas being in school at T11 
was unrelated to T11 prosociality, suggests that it was not the college ex-
perience but something about the individuals who had not finished school 
by T12 that was associated with lower prosocial disposition scores.
1004 EisEnbErg et al. in Journal of Personality and social Psychology, 82 (2002) 
as prosocial individuals. This self-perception may solidify in adult-
hood, when people are likely to become involved in close relation-
ships or working relationships that provide many possibilities for 
sharing in response to legitimate requests or cues from others (e.g., 
preschoolers who were high in compliant prosocial behavior were 
targets of peer requests; Eisenberg et al., 1981).
It is likely that the stability in markers of a prosocial disposi-
tion is due to a number of factors. These probably include temper-
amental and/or genetic contributions to empathy-related respond-
ing (e.g., Hoffman, 1981; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992). Moreover, 
shared rearing environmental influences (Krueger et al., 2001), 
including parental child-rearing practices (Koestner et al., 1990), 
may contribute to interindividual stability in prosocial tendencies. 
Although it is unclear to what degree constitutional and environ-
mental factors contribute to consistency in prosocial tendencies, 
it appears that stable individual differences in empathy-related re-
sponding emerge by childhood and likely account for some con-
sistency over time.
Another interesting finding was that the cognitions about pro-
social behaviors, as reflected in prosocial moral reasoning, were 
related to concurrent and temporally distal measures of a proso-
cial personality. Specifically, both PROM and interview prosocial 
moral judgment scores tended to be related to the self-reported and 
friend-reported prosocial disposition scores in adulthood and to 
empathy and sympathy years prior. This pattern of findings is con-
sistent with theoretical assertions linking prosocial moral judgment 
with individual differences in perspective taking, sympathy, and 
moral behavior. The continuity in the association between prosocial 
moral judgment and prosocial responding in late adolescence and 
into adulthood in this study is consistent with the notion that other-
oriented cognitions and emotions may foster prosocial moral judg-
ment and vice versa (Eisenberg, 1986; Hoffman, 1987). Indeed, it 
is likely that, with age, the motives and values reflected in indi-
viduals’ moral judgment increasingly become a component of their 
prosocial dispositions (or lack thereof). As people’s moral reason-
ing becomes more value-based and/or grounded in mature perspec-
tive taking, it is reasonable to expect moral judgment to become in-
timately bound to prosocial emotions (e.g., sympathy) and actions 
as well as to other prosocial cognitions (e.g., cognitions regarding 
ascription of responsibility; see Hoffman, 2000).
It is noteworthy that prosocial moral judgment was related not 
only to self-reported prosocial dispositions but also, to some de-
gree, to friends’ ratings of participants’ prosociality. This find-
ing provides additional evidence that moral judgment contributes 
in some manner to a prosocial disposition in adulthood. However, 
it is unclear why friends’ ratings at T11 (age 23–24) were not re-
lated to prosocial moral judgment, either on the concurrent PROM 
or on the moral interview administered 2 years prior or subsequent, 
or to measures of prosocial responding at T9 or before. The fact 
that friends’ reports of prosociality at T10 and T12 but not at T11 
were related to reasoning on the PROM at T11 suggests that the 
friends who provided reports on participants’ prosocial dispositions 
at T11 may not have been reliable reporters. This prior hypothesis 
is strengthened by the finding that friends’ reports at T10 and T12 
but not T11 frequently were correlated with earlier empathy-related 
and prosocial measures. It is possible that the friends at T11, many 
of whom had known the participants for a long period of time, had 
had insufficient recent contact with the participants to make ac-
curate assessments. The transition out of college for a number of 
the participants may have disconnected them from college friends 
who had interacted with them on a frequent basis while they were 
in school (only 9 of the 48 friends at T11 were also raters at T10, 
and only 17 of the T11 friends were also raters at T12). Alterna-
tively, the study participants may have been going through tempo-
rary transitions at age 23–24 that affected their behavior, especially 
as viewed by others.
In summary, the results of this study support the conclusions 
that there are individual differences in prosocial dispositions and 
that these differences clearly emerge by adolescence and are some-
what stable into adulthood. In many instances, the patterns of cor-
relations across time and measures was consistent and of moderate 
magnitude (significant correlations ranged from approximately .35 
to over .70). Moreover, the findings suggest that prosocial moral 
judgment plays a role in adults’ prosocial tendencies and is related 
to empathy-related responding at younger ages. However, it should 
be noted that the sample in this study is small and homogenous. Al-
though we examined for outliers, the findings must be viewed as 
tentative and may not be generalizable to different socioeconomic 
or racial/ethnic groups. It is possible that less stability would be 
noted in a lower socioeconomic sample because of the instabil-
ity of the participants’ life circumstances. Nonetheless, given that 
many of the findings were obtained despite a small sample size and 
limited power, it is likely that a number of the correlational find-
ings will be replicated in larger samples.
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